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Senior Lecturer in Economics 
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Coventry - England
The present paper explores the probable effectiveness of the 
Greek antimonopoly legislation in achieving its stated objective of 
improving the competitive forces in the Greek economy.
It does so by providing a brief discussion of the relevant 
economic theory underlying antitrust policies, as well as an ex­
amination of the legal rules, methods and machinery required for 
the proper enforcement of such policies.
After an outline of the key substantive points of the new Greek 
legislation there follows a summary discussion of the development 
and workings of similar policies in the US, UK and EEC and a 
brief critique of such policies.
The paper ends with an evaluation of the prospects of the Greek 
legislation to be an effective tool for the promotion of competition 
in Greece, by reference to both the preceding discussion and fac­
tors specific to the Greek economy, and concludes that the new 
policy is unlikely to herald the rise of more competition in Greece. 
Greek businessmen need not lose their sleep on account of that 
policy.
introduction
Monopoly and oligopoly situations are prevalent in 
the Greek economy, and economic power is dis­
tributed very unevenly, particularly in the secondary 
sector. According to the 1973 Industrial Census, 
93.5% of industrial establishments (small industry) ac­
counted for 21.7% of horse power (used as proxy for 
capital), while a mere 0.5% of such establishments (100 
employees and over) accounted for 59.3% of total horse 
power of the manufacturing sector. A similar picture is 
also emerging from the following table giving the five-firm 
concentration ratios’ in terms of employment in Greek 
manufacturing in 1973. Although employment data do 
not represent the best yardstick of concentration, as they 
tend to understate it in capital intensive industries and









20 3.92 30 18.29
21 32.11 31 36.02
22 45.86 32 54.85
23 13.79 33 23.52
24 4.70 34 85.31
25 1 1.51 35 11.86
26 5.45 36 6.87
27 56.78 37 24.17
28 11.38 38 26.06
29 5.97 39 9.74
Sources: Industrial Census 1973. ICAP Financial Directory of Greek Companies 
and Federation of Greek Industries Bulletin (various issues).
— The author wishes to acknowledge the help and constructive 
criticisms received from Messrs. S. Jones, M. Kelly and R. Koun- 
douros.
This article was submitted to The Greek Review of Social 
Research in September 1978.
I. Defined as employment accounted for by the largest five 
firms in the industry divided by total employment of the industry.
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overstate it in labour intensive ones, they are used here for 
lack of any other suitable size variable. This table 
provides support for the proposition that market concen­
tration in Greek manufacturing varies significantly, with 
some industries exhibiting significant market power.2
Also the Greek economy has been bedeviled over 
the years by restrictive practices of one sort or 
another which have seriously contributed to its inef­
ficiency. This then would point to the need for some 
kind of policy for checking monopolistic and restric­
tive practices or for dealing with the problem of 
economic power. However, with the exception of some 
inadequate provisions, such policy was lacking until 
Law 703/1977 on the control of monopolies and 
oligopolies and protection of free competition was 
enacted by Parliament.3
It must be emphasised that while monopolistic and 
oligopolistic situations were present in the Greek econ­
omy earlier its development had not yet reached the 
point to warrant an antitrust policy.4 The main priori­
ty of economic policy, particularly after 1953, was the 
changing of the underdeveloped character of the Greek 
economy through industrialisation. Consequently, it 
was understandable in the circumstances for the 
authorities not only to allow a free hand to domestic 
and foreign industrialists and capitalists, but also to 
actively promote attempts at industrialisation through 
a series of inducements at the expense of other con­
siderations, were they of a monopolistic/oligopolistic 
nature, environmental nature or any other. It is only 
recently that Greeks are waking up to the realisation 
that the uncontrolled industrialisation of the 1960’s 
and 1970’s had also certain undesirable side effects. 
Of course this is not to imply that had an antitrust 
policy been previously enforceable the organisational 
structure and distribution of economic power in the 
Greek economy would have been different. The 
promotion and achievement of a competitive economy 
depends not upon legislation per se, but upon the ef­
fectiveness of enforcement. The experience and perfor­
mance of other countries demonstrates that in itself, 
antitrust legislation is comparatively powerless in con­
tributing decisively towards this target. The aim of this 
paper is to consider the new Greek antitrust policy 
and evaluate its prospects towards achieving its stated 
objectives of enhancing competition in the Greek 
economy.The raison d’être of antitrust policy is to be found 
in the failure of the free enterprise system, in certain 
forms of industrial organisation, to provide an efficient 
regulatory mechanism of the economy and the need to
2. For a discussion of concentration in the Greek Chemical In­
dustry see: G. Petrochilos, «Foreign Capital in the Greek Chemical 
Industry» in M. Nikolinakos (Ed.), Multinationals in Greece (in 
Greek), Nea Synora Publications, Athens, 1982, forthcoming.
, 3. Nomos 703, Ephimeris tis Kiverniseos, No 278, Tefchos I, 
Athinai 26.9.1977 (Law 703, The Government Gazette, No. 278, 
Part I, Athens 26.9.1977).
4. G.A. Petrochilos, «Greek Antitrust Policy: An Analysis», The
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. XXIV, No.3, 1979, pp. 595-619.
improve the working of the market. It follows then 
that an essential element of antitrust policy is agree­
ment on its objectives. It is the role of economic 
theory to provide such objectives but, sadly, there 
seems to be little evidence of a consensus among 
economists on the issue. Indeed, there is disagreement 
on the desirability of even having an antitrust policy at 
all. However, given an economy with a large and 
strong sector of decentralised decision-making, most 
people would agree that there needs to be a means of 
checking excesses of the system. «Like the Lord, com­
petition may well work in mysterious ways so that 
prices and changes alone are an inadequate guide to 
the operation of the ‘unseen hand’».5 The objectives 
and rules of antitrust policy are controversial, and an 
attempted resolution of the conroversy is outside the 
brief of this paper. Nevertheless, proper evaluation of 
the likely effectiveness of the new Greek policy de­
mands analysis of economic and legal factors, as well 
as examination of the workings of similar legislation 
elsewhere.
The economic theory underlying antitrust is treated 
in Section II which also attempts to set up certain ob­
jectives by following the structure-conduct- 
performance approach. Section III deals with legal 
rules and procedures characterising such policies. An 
outline of the main provisions of the Greek legislation 
is given in Section IV which is followed, in Section V, 
by a brief discussion of the American, British and 
European Community experience of antitrust legisla­
tion. Finally, an evaluation of the Greek legislation is 
attempted in Section VI.
the economic framework
Antitrust legislation is usually cast in terms of 
promoting or protecting competition. Not unnaturally 
a precise definition of the kind of competition which it 
seeks to preserve or achieve is usually omitted, and it 
is left to economic theory to provide us with such a 
definition. The problem, however, has proved to be a 
thorny one. The major difficulty is that only perfect 
competition (defined in text-book terms) can produce 
those results beneficial to society, in terms of the op­
timum allocation of resources, which are usually 
associated with «competition». This concept of com­
petition, however, is unrealistic for the purposes of an­
titrust legislation. It is difficult to imagine a piece of 
legislation which aims, among other things, to 
drastically change the structural organisation of 
various markets. Such change might generate far more 
awkward and difficult problems than those it set out 
to solve.6
Assuming, for the moment, that such a change 
could be beneficially effected, the perfect competitive
5. J.M. Lishan, «The Cellophane Case and the Cross-elasticity 
of Demand», Antitrust Bulletin, Voi. 4, 1959, p. 598.
6. It must be remembered, though, that the first antitrust legisla­
tion (Sherman Act, 1890) was largely influenced by considerations 
of perfect competition.
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model might still be inadequate for the purposes of 
guiding antitrust policy. Under «perfect» conditions the 
tendency is for resources to be efficiently allocated, for 
prices to reflect the true opportunity cost of resources 
used, and, in the long run, for only the internally ef­
ficient firms to remain in operation, each producing at 
the lowest average cost (under the given technological 
conditions) and to full capacity. However, what hap­
pens to those industries in which the output necessary 
for a firm to achieve its lowest cost is so large, in rela­
tion to national sales, that only a few producers can 
remain effectively in the industy? In such cases perfect 
competition might not be the best solution for society 
or for the industry in question. In such a situation one 
is forced to choose between a large number of com­
peting firms, each unable to reach the necessary 
economies of scale for drastic cost reduction and for 
consequent price reduction, or a few large firms, each 
able to achieve the full economies of scale but opposed 
to price competition.7 In other words, the choice is 
between an industry conducive to maximising 
allocative efficiency and one which best serves the in­
terests of technical efficiency. It is obvious that 
something has gone sour with the theory. The static 
framework of the perfectly competitive model and its 
preoccupation with price rivalry makes it unsuitable as 
a basis for an antitrust policy. It fails to take account 
of some crucial factors which affect not only the 
organisation of the particular firm but the overall 
economy.8 If this is the case, what kind of competition 
is acceptable as a guide to the formulation of antitrust 
policy?
A number of people have suggested that antitrust 
legislation should seek to foster and to maintain what 
J. Clark has termed «workable competition».9 The 
theory of workable competition is concerned with fac­
tors which stimulate economic rivalry. It tries to judge 
forms of industrial organisation and company policies by 
reference to the extent to which they promote or hamper 
this rivalry. The main prerequisite of workable competi­
tion is that there is an adequate number of choices of ac­
tion open both to consumers and producers. However, 
this concept of competition is far from precise as it leaves 
vague what is meant by «adequate». Critics of the 
workable competition concept are opposed to its use on 
the grounds that this vagueness makes the concept un­
suitable as a basis on which to build an antitrust policy. 
According to these critics the concept fails to outline how
7. It must, however, be pointed out that the empirical evidence 
suggests that technical economies of scale, which are the most im­
portant ones, can be reached at relatively low or medium levels of 
output.
8. S. Peterson, «Anti-Trust and the Classical Model», American 
Economic Review, Voi. 47, 1957, pp. 60-78, reprinted in M. 
Gilbert (Edit.), The Modern Business Enterprise, Penguin, 1972, 
pp. 54-75.
9. J. Clark, «Towards a Concept of Workable Competition», 
American Economic Review, Voi. 30, 1940. See also G.C. Allen,
Monopoly and Restrictive Practices, Unwin, 1968, pp. 23-33 and
A. Hunter (Edit.), Monopoly and Competition, Penguin, 1969, pp.
71-91.
much competition must exist before an industry can be 
called «workably» competitive. In other words, how 
much monopoly must be shown to exist before antitrust 
action is justified?10 *Since workable competition fails to 
answer these questions, it is held that it cannot provide 
appropriate objectives for an antitrust policy.
The structure-conduct-performance approach, how­
ever, provides a firmer basis for such a policy and is 
capable of producing some partial solutions to the 
problem. By recognising that there is a functional rela­
tion between structure, or rather the various elements 
of market structure, and performance through the con­
duct of firms (i.e., through their pricing, investment 
and product policies), it is possible to set up certain 
non-controversial objectives for an antitrust policy. 
These objectives can then be used as a means of ap­
praising market performance by establishing the extent 
to which actual performance in specific markets devi­
ates from potential performance."
Basic elements of market structure likely to influence 
the conduct of firms are product differentiation, seller 
concentration and barriers to entry of new firms. The 
precise way in which these elements (structure) in­
teract and help form a firm’s behaviour pattern (which 
in turn influences the firm’s performance) may not be 
quite known. Indeed, the problem is an empirical one 
and much more research is required in this area so 
that one could have «...fairly conclusive tests of the 
theoretically predicted associations of the seller con­
centration of industries to their price-cost margins or 
profit rates (measuring allocative efficiency); of their 
conditions of entry to the same and related aspects of 
performance; and of the degree of defferentiation of 
their products to the size of their selling costs and 
possibly to other dimensions of performance».12
Although the exact form of this functional relation 
is not given, economic analysis and empirical work on 
the subject provide useful information with which the 
economist can attempt the formulation of specific 
objectives of antitrust policy. One may begin by 
stressing that the aim of legislation should be to foster 
a competitive system characterised by efficiency and 
progressiveness. This may sound like broad platitude 
but it does have the merit of highlighting some of the 
issues involved. By concentrating on these two aspects 
one can evaluate the workings of different market 
structures and can use public policy to strengthen or 
correct certain deficiencies. In the words of J.S. Bain, 
«the market performance of industries is the ultimate 
test of how well they fulfill their social function of 
enhancing material welfare, and the aim of regulatory
10. W. Adams, «The ‘Rule of Reason’: Workable Competition 
or Workable Monopoly?», The Yale Law Journal, Voi. 63, No 3, 
1953, pp. 348-370, reprinted in S.E. Berki (Edit.), Antitrust Policy- 
Economics and the Law, Heath, 1966, which also contains a selec­
tion. of interesting articles on the subject.
11. See J.S. Bain, Industrial Organisation, Second Edition, J. 
Wiley and Sons, 1968, p. 498 and R. Caves, American Industry: 
Structure-Conduct-Performance, Third Edition, Prentice-Hall, 
1972. p. 94.
12. J.S. Bain, op. cit·, p. 432.
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policy should be to improve performance in those in­
dustries where it is ‘unworkable’».13
Firms in different market structures are expected to 
perform differently with regard to these criteria. For 
example, in a market where there are low degrees of 
concentration and of product differentiation and 
barriers to entry, firms have no pricing policies of their 
own. Prices are dictated by the market and are expect­
ed to be competitive. Misallocation of resources may 
tend to be minimised within such a market and ef­
ficiency, in the classical sense, may tend to be at­
tained.
One is tempted at this point to embrace such 
markets as «the ideal», towards which one should 
strive in order to achieve overall allocative efficiency 
and raise welfare. This, however, may not be enough. 
Considerations of second best point to the fact that 
overall welfare may not be increased if other markets 
are not also «competitive». Further, in a market such 
as this, the incentive for research and for innovation in 
new products and methods of production is likely to 
be missing. Technical progress may be slow in coming. 
The introduction of these dynamic elements thus dis­
torts the original picture and prepares the way for 
taking another look at imperfectly competitive struc­
tures.
Schumpeter has shown that a degree of monopoly is 
necessary if an economy is to be progressive.14 Firms 
must be protected lest they lack the motivation to 
research new technology, research which can, if suc­
cessful, significantly· reduce costs. There is, however, 
no unambiguous empirical evidence that size is 
associated positively with progressiveness. On the con­
trary, smaller firms tend to obtain more patents, in 
proportion to total sales, than do larger firms. 
Moreover, during the current century, the individual 
has been the source of many important inventions.15
In this context, one needs to examine the movement 
towards the establishment of a more concentrated in­
dustrial structure through mergers and takeovers. 
Whether mergers are or are not in the public interest 
requires the analysis of a set of diverse factors; reliable 
data on which to base such analysis may, in many 
cases, be unavailable to the management of the merg­
ing firms, let alone be at the disposal of any agency 
charged with antitrust. This dearth of reliable data hin­
ders objective appraisal of the merits of particular 
cases. The degree of confidence with which one can 
pronounce upon the desirability of mergers is therefore 
rather limited. How can economic theory help?
In neoclassical economics monopoly is condemned, 
per se, on the familiar grounds of misallocation of res­
ources.16 It would appear that if the objective of an­
titrust policy was to maximise social welfare, proposed 
mergers should be disallowed in that the merger, once
13. Ibid., p. 431.
14. J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
Fifth Edition, Unwin, 1966.
15. J. Jewkes, D. Sawers, R. Stillerman, The Sources of Inven­
tion, Macmillan, Revised Edition, 1969.
16. See A. Harberger, «Monopoly and Resource Allocation»,
accomplished, would contribute to increased divergence 
between price and marginal cost and so augment the 
dead weight welfare loss. By increasing monopoly 
power, a merger might help bring about higher prices 
and consequent allocative inefficiency. At the same 
time, though, a merger might facilitate reduced costs 
through economies of large scale production. (There is, 
of course, no guarantee that these reduced costs would 
be passed on to the consumers in the form of lower 
prices.) Since social welfare, the maximisation of 
which is sought, is given by the sum of consumer sur­
plus and producer surplus,17 it is perfectly possible for 
the benefits of mergers in the form of cost reductions 
(accruing to producers) to outweigh the costs of in­
creased prices and for mergers to be beneficial to 
public interest.18 In a case where, through an increase 
of market power, a merger leads to both allocative in­
efficiency and economies, it is proposed that a trade­
off test be conducted to decide whether the merger 
should be allowed. According to O.E. Williamson,19 
mergers passing this test should, subject to certain 
qualifications, be permitted to proceed.
However, both the neoclassical theory and the 
Williamson argument fail to take account of the fact that, 
apart from worsening allocative efficiency, through the 
increase in price-cost margins, the increased monopoly 
power likely to be entailed by a merger affects 
what Leibenstein has termed «X-efficiency».20 Since the 
forces of competition are diminished by a merger there 
is less incentive for the firm to pursue policies of cost 
minimisation. It is likely, therefore, that X-inefificiency 
increases as a result of increased monopoly power. It 
has, in fact, been estimated that the welfare loss due to 
X-inefficiency is likely to be much larger than the
American Economic Review, Voi. 44, May 1954, pp. 77-78 and D. 
Schwartznam, «The Burden of Monopoly», Journal of Political 
Economy, Voi. 68, December 1960, pp. 627-630, F.M. Scherer, In­
dustrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Rand 
McNally, 1970, p. 408, K. Cowling and D.C. Mueller, «The Social 
Costs of Monopoly Power», The Economic Journal, Voi. 88, 1978, 
pp. 727-748.
17. The social welfare function to be maximised is given by the 
difference between total social benefit and total social cost, i.e., W 
= TSB - TSC = TR + CS - TC = CS + (TR - TC) = CS + 
PS, where CS is consumer surplus and PS stands for producer sur­
plus. See O.E. Williamson, «Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal 
Capital under Indivisibility Constraints», American Economic 
Review, Voi. 56, September 1966, pp. 810-27, reprinted in R. Tur- 
vey (Edit.), Public Enterprise, Penguin, 1968, and also in O.E. 
Williamson «Economies as Anti-Trust Defense», American 
Economic Review, Voi. 58, May 1968, pp. 18-36, reprinted in C.K. 
Rowley (Edit.), Readings in Industrial Economics, Voi. 2, Mac­
millan, 1972, pp. 136-49.
18. This, of course, leaves the question of distribution unanswer­
ed. It is assumed that, to deal with the problem of distribution of 
income, the authorities have at their disposal means other than the 
antitrust policy. Benefits accruing to both consumers and 
producers are thus treated alike. See M.A. Crew and C.K. Rowley, 
«Anti-Trust Policy: Economics versus Management Science», 
Moorgate and Wall Street, Autumn 1970, pp. 19-34, reprinted in 
C.K. Rowley (Edit.), op. cit., pp. 136-49.
19. O.E. Williamson (1968), op. cit.
20. H. Leibenstein, «Allocative Efficiency v ‘X-Efficiency’», 
American Economic Review, Voi. 56, June 1966, pp. 392-415. See
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welfare loss due to misallocation of resources.21 
Further evidence of X-inefficiency in oligopolistic 
markets is provided by the managerial and behavioural 
theories of the firm, where «management slack» and 
«organisational slack» are recognised as important fac­
tors in shaping business objectives. This, of course, 
serves to illustrate that the issues in question are of an 
empirical nature and that the knowledge required for 
the purposes of formulating public policy should be 
obtained by empirical evidence, since knowledge on a 
priori grounds is often uncertain. The part of 
economic theory best suited for an analysis of this 
kind is that dealing with industrial organisation. In 
that it provides a better understanding of the workings 
of the various markets, this analysis enables 
economists to evaluate the contributions made by dif­
ferent firms operating in different market structures. It 
therefore offers a firmer basis for an antitrust policy. 
For these reasons the part of economic theory pertain­
ing to industrial organisation should underlie any an­
titrust legislation.
legal rules, methods and machinery
If antitrust legislation is to be successful appropriate 
legal rules need to be formulated and the machinery 
for the implementation of such legislation needs to be 
set up.22 Generally speaking the choice is between a 
set of rules characterised either by flexibility or by ri­
gidity. Fixed rules, often denounced because of their 
rigidity, nonetheless provide firms with sufficient assur­
ance as to where they stand vis-à-vis the law. The pre­
dictability of fixed rules ensures that businessmen 
know whether their actions and decisions are «legal» 
or «illegal». In this respect fixed rules tend to minimise 
uncertainty, and there is thus obvious reason for 
recommending them. On the other hand, rigid rules do 
impose a straightjacket on business. Accordingly one 
looks to the alternative. The adoption of general prin­
ciples guiding antitrust legislation, with the advantage 
of greater flexibility (in that each case can be ex­
amined on its merits), would result in an element of 
uncertainty and also in unavoidable delays in antitrust 
litigation. Flexible rules, therefore, suffer in two 
respects—they increase uncertainty for firms and tend 
to render the antitrust legislation ineffective. In the 
American antitrust literature fixed and flexible rules 
have come to be known as the «per se» versus «the 
rule of reason» doctrines respectively. The former refer 
to company agreements, decisions or actions which 
are in themselves illegal while the latter exercise 
«reasonableness» as the means to establish whether or
also W.S. Comanor and H. Leibenstein, «Allocative Efficiency, X- 
Efficiency and the Measurement of Welfare Losses», Economica, 
new series, Voi. 36, August 1969, pp. 304-9.
21. See H. Leibenstein, op. cit., W.S. Comanor & H. Leibens- 
tein, op. cit. and F.M. Scherer, op. cit., p. 408. Scherer calculates 
that for the American economy total losses due to market power 
could be anywhere between 3% and 12.5% of GNP (for 1966).
22. S.E. Berki (Edit.), op. cit., pp. viii-ix.
not illegal conduct exists. The «rule of reason» 
criterion considers, for example, that the loss in com­
petition may be outweighed by other advantages. 
However, the role of these legal rules is to facilitate 
judicial enquiries and to help in the interpretation of 
the law in particular cases. This means that discussion 
of the main lines of thought regarding legislation for 
the promotion of competition must precede the ex­
amination of such legal rules. By and large, antitrust 
legislation has sought to promote and to protect com­
petition by any of the following methods, either singly 
or in combination:
1) by the outright prohibition of certain agreements, 
decisions or actions by two or more firms; for ex­
ample, the fixing of prices, the sharing of markets 
etc.
2) by allowing such agreements, decisions or actions 
but by retaining the right to refer such agreements 
to an appropriate body which would be vested with 
the authority to discontinue such practices, on the 
grounds that they are «socially unacceptable».
3) by requiring prior registration of such agreements, 
decisions or actions and the notification by inter­
ested firms of such agreements. An appropriate 
body would then be called upon to recommend 
whether or not the said agreements should be put 
on the register.
It must be emphasised that these methods deal with 
the problems of restrictive practices only. They leave 
the problem of monopoly to be tackled in a different 
manner, if at all. The same legal rules mentioned 
above seem, however, to apply to both, that is to the 
treatment of problems of monopoly power as well as 
those of restrictive practice. The first and third meth­
ods constitute a more appropriate preventive approach 
to antitrust while the second is more applicable if a 
curative approach is favoured or is necessary.
The first method proves «illegality» simply by show­
ing that certain agreements have indeed taken place. 
Conviction depends, however, upon the rules or legal 
doctrines which the courts are using for the interpreta­
tion of the law. This method is obviously rigid and, 
within the framework of a «free enterprise» system, 
can be considered a significant constraint of the 
freedom of businessmen.
Under the second method firms are, in principle, 
free to enter into certain agreements. They do, howT 
ever, face the possibility of having such agreements in­
vestigated by competent bodies which can declare 
them either lawful and retainable or unlawful and un­
enforceable. Particular agreements or decisions 
harmful to society can thus be perpetuated until such 
time as the rather slow investigative machinery catches 
up with the culprits. In the interim, however, markets 
may have been exploited and monopoly profits made. 
The judicial decisions cannot hope to remedy fully the 
damage done in this interim period because such deci­
sions tend to be made tardily and acted upon only 
half heartedly. Therefore a feeling of injustice may per­
sist.
The third method relies on prior notification of such
30
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agreements to a competent authority which must rule 
on whether or not the agreements are within the law. 
Those agreements which pass the test of acceptability 
are then placed on a special register and are allowed 
to be implemented. This method may go some way 
towards meeting criticisms levelled at the other two.
It would appear that the first method is that most 
likely to give rise to conflict between the rule of reason 
and the per se rule. The rigidity of approach of this 
first method contrasts with the flexibility inherent in 
the other two. Legislation which reflects a «pragmatic» 
approach to the problems of monopoly and of restric­
tive practices thus tends to be based upon either the 
second or third methods, or upon a combination of the 
two. Some of the points raised above, with regard to 
legal rules, also apply to these methods.
It has been suggested that if the first method is used 
the existence of any prohibited action proves guilt. In 
regard to methods two and three, however, the distinc­
tion between a firm’s lawful or unlawful behaviour is 
based upon consideration of all the relevant factors. 
Each case, in other words, is examined solely on its 
own merits. To facilitate examination along these lines 
it is useful to compare the results of each case against 
some kind of abstract criterion, viz that which pur­
ports to promote the public interest. However, «public 
interest» is by no means easy to define. Indeed, even 
legislation explicitly stated to be for the purpose of 
protecting the public interest contains no such defini­
tion. The most that one can expect is perhaps to ob­
tain a list of various guidelines which, in the opinion of 
the legislators, can be considered conducive to 
protecting the public interest. What these specific 
guidelines are and how they are arrived at, is obvious­
ly the product of a thorough weighing up of economic, 
social, political and other factors. In this respect, 
political will to arrive at and to enforce an effective 
policy is an important factor, not only in shaping such 
guidelines but in making antitrust policy successful. 
This point will be treated in more detail later on.
The last element in an antitrust legislation is the es­
tablishment of an appropriate mechanism, that is, of 
various procedures and of competent bodies, the latter 
being empowered to implement and to enforce the 
legislation. For example, the tasks of initiating 
searches and of bringing to light legislative violations, 
of instituting proceedings for ascertaining and remedy­
ing such violations, of preparing and presenting the 
case against culprits in a court, and of ensuring that 
the recommendations of the court are enforced, must 
be covered and established by the antitrust legislation. 
So too must the very bodies which are to be responsi­
ble for such tasks. The law must also vest such bodies 
with powers to discharge their duties unhindered.
It does not follow, however, that the mere existence 
of antitrust legislation will ensure the promotion and 
protection of competitive forces in an economy. Such 
ensurance essentially depends upon the way in which 
legislation is applied. As is the case in the entire field 
of public policy, applicability may be circumscribed by 
a number of factors. Prominent amongst these factors
are the political will (i.e., the degree of political 
commitment to its aims) and the compatibility/incom­
patibility between the aims of the legislation and those 
of general public policy, notably economic policy. It is 
unlikely that the promotion and protection of competi­
tion will feature highly in the list of priorities of any 
government. Usually, whenever there are economic dif­
ficulties, the first victim is competition. These con­
siderations, as well as the «pragmatic» approach to an 
titrust, may well lead to the emasculation of an an­
titrust policy.
the legislation
The objectives of the Greek antitrust legislation 
were made clear in an explanatory statement which 
accompanied the draft law to the Parliament. This 
statement referred to the need of averting the creation 
of monopolistic or oligopolistic situations, which could 
hamper the normal functioning of markets, as well as 
the need to bring Greek legislation into line with that 
of the European Economic Community, in anticipation 
of full Greek membership. Further, in an interview 
with the Athens daily Kathimerini on 27/5/78, the 
Minister of Trade saw in the legislation a means to 
achieve economic and social progress without inflation 
and social upheavals.The last section of this study 
considers the first objective in detail. It should, 
however, be stated that the second objective of the 
legislation is fully met as L. 703/1977 not only follows 
closely the relevant Community legislation, but its Ar­
ticles 1 and 2 (which are the essence of the whole 
legislation) are almost exact translations of Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.23
The main provisions of the Greek antitrust legisla­
tion are as follows:
Article 1 prohibits all agreements between and 
restrictive practices by firms or associations of firms 
where such agreements or practices may affect com­
petition, particularly in the areas of: the fixing of sell­
ing prices or of buying prices; control of production, 
distribution, technological development or investment; 
sharing of markets or of sources of supply; applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other parties, thereby placing them at a disadvantage. 
Finally the prohibition extends to the concluding of 
contracts which make parties subject to additional 
obligations unconnected with the subject of such con­
tracts. Article I exempts from this prohibition such 
agreements or restrictive practices (or parts of 
them) which the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition24 considers that they satisfy all the
23. It should be pointed out that Articles 85 and 86 of the Trea­
ty of Rome refer to interstate trade while present Greek legislation 
applies only within Greece. When Greece becomes a full member 
of the EEC, Community legislation will, automatically, be ap­
plicable in Greece itself. Furthermore, in cases of conflict, it will 
supersede national legislation.
24. A body specially set up by Law 703/1977 to implement the 
legislation. See below.
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following conditions, viz agreements or practices 
which:
(a) contribute to the improvement of production or 
distribution of goods or to the promotion of 
technological or economic progress and which 
allow consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit,
(b) do not impose on firms restrictions beyond those 
necessary for the attainment of the above objec­
tives,
(c) do not afford to such firms the possibility of 
eliminating competition in large parts of the rele­
vant market.
Article 2 prohibits a firm from abusing its position 
of dominance throughout the national market or part 
of it. Such abuse may consist of:
(a) direct or indirect compulsion to fix buying or sell­
ing prices, or other unfair trading conditions,
(b) limiting production, consumption or technological 
development to the detriment of the consumers,
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other parties, thereby placing 
them at a disadvantage, and,
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the 
acceptance by other parties of additional obliga­
tions unconnected with the subject of such con­
tracts.
Article 3 states the general principle of the legisla­
tion. Accordingly, it prohibits all agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices, covered by Art. 1 and abuse 
of dominant position covered by Art. 2 without any 
prior decision of a competent authority being neces­
sary.
Article 4 allows mergers and takeovers, and states 
explicitly that these do not constitute infringement of 
Article 1.
Article 5 extends the legislation to nationalised in­
dustries or public utilities as well as to agricultural and 
transportation enterprises but it also provides for the 
exemption of such enterprises. Exemption depends up­
on the recommendation of the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition and upon the joint decision 
of the Ministers of Coordination and Trade and 
Agriculture, Transport or Merchant Marine (Which 
ministers are called upon to make this decision, apart 
from those of Coordination and Trade, depends up- 
onthe kind of enterprise under consideration). The 
reason given for this exemption is that such enterprises 
may be of significant importance to the national 
economy.
Finally, Article 6 extends the provisions of Article 5 
to exporting firms. It exempts agreements, decisions or 
restrictive practices aimed exclusively at the promotion 
or the strengthening of export activity, so long as ac­
tions do not infringe international obligations.
Implementation of the law is in the hands of two 
new bodies wihin the Ministry of Trade. These bodies, 
which were specially established by the legislation, are 
called the Office for the Protection of Competition and
the Commission for the Protection of Competition.25 
The Office is established within the Civil Service and 
for its manning it can call not only upon civil servants 
but also upon the services of other qualified staff out­
side of the Civil Service (Article 7). Amongst its wide 
ranging tasks are those of:
(a) keeping the Register of Restrictive Practices,
(b) searching for violations of the law and generally 
gathering information,
(c) preparing and presenting cases to the Commission,
(d) implementing the decisions of the Commission and 
those of the courts,
(e) performing the tasks of the Secretariat for the 
Commission,
(f) referring to the courts any violations of the legisla­
tion, etc.
In performing its duties the Office can demand any 
information relevant to the present legislation. This 
authority extends to all firms and trusts, and to 
natural or legal persons of private or public law. If the 
information is not forthcoming, or if it is misleading or 
deficient, those representing the bodies from which it is 
sought are liable. In the case of private enterprises, 
this liability is in the form of fines of up to 500,000 
drachmas. Civil servants or representatives of «legal 
persons of public law» are liable to disciplinary action. 
These penalties are apart from, and additional to, any 
penal sanctions and are decided by the Commission 
(Article 25). The staff of the Office are vested with the 
powers of tax inspectors, and they can check books 
and other documents and demand receipt of copies of 
such documents. They are also empowered to search 
offices and other premises, search the houses of firms’ 
representatives (provided they act constitutionally) and 
receive sworn or unsworn statements. Those 
obstructing the actions of Office staff are liable to 
fines ranging from 100,000 to lm. drachmas, the ex­
tent to be decided by the Commission (Art. 26). Arti­
cle 27, on the other hand, obliges the staff of the Of­
fice to keep confidential any information which does 
not pertain to their specific investigation. As far as 
relevant confidential information is concerned, staff 
have to notify its finding to the Office in their state­
ments. In turn, such information can constitute part of 
the submission to the Commission or to the courts, by 
which process the information naturally loses its con­
fidentiality. Staff found guilty of disclosing confidential 
information can be fined up to 200,000 drachmas and 
are also liable to disciplinary action as well as to any 
penal sanctions.
Also established by the legislation was the Commis­
sion for the Protection of Competition. This important 
body consists of seven members, one of whom is the 
Director of the Office. Its broad tasks include the issu­
ing of orders, e.g. for a firm to refrain from the kind 
of restrictive practices covered by Art. 1 and 2. Its or­
ders are mandatory but are also challengeable in the
25. Hereafter referred to as the Office and the Commission.
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courts. The Commission is also responsible for ad­
vising individual Ministers on particular questions, 
such advice being of a consultative nature.
if a violation of Articles 1 and 2 is established, the 
Commission can ask the offending firm or firms to 
stop the violation(s) and can force enterprises to 
refrain from repeating such violations. In cases where 
enterprises persist with the violation it can also threat­
en to impose fines. Lastly, the Commission can impose 
fines of up to 10% of the gross earnings of the enter- 
prise(s) in question, these earnings being related to the 
year in which the violation took place or of the 
previous year (Art. 9). The decisions of the Commis­
sion can be challenged in the administrative courts of 
justice by those against whom the decisions were 
made, or by those who first reported the violation to 
the Office, or by the Minister of Trade, or by the 
General Counsel of State (Epitropos Epikratias). 
Similarly, appeals against the decision of the courts of 
justice can be made to the Athens Administrative 
Court of Appeal, and, as a final resort, application can 
be made to the Council of State26 for revocation of a 
previous court’s decision (Articles 15 & 16).
The Commission is obliged to inform the district at 
torney’s office of any decision regarding violations of 
Articles 1 & 2 within ten days of such decision being 
reached. Those participating in agreements and deci­
sions and/or committing acts prohibited by Articles 1 
& 2, can be sentenced to at least three months in jail 
and be fined between 100,000 and 200,000 drachmas, 
penalties which can be doubled if an offence is repeat­
ed. The same penalties face those who: (a) hinder the 
searches of the staff of the Office (b) refuse to provide 
information (c) furnish the authorities with information 
which they know is misleading or hide the 
truth and (d) either refuse to give statements or 
provide statements which contain false information or 
hide the truth (Art. 28 & 29). Notification of restric­
tive practices by firms or trusts to the Office absolves 
the representatives of such firms from the above penal 
sanctions. These persons, however, are liable to sanc­
tions if their firm, within 15 days of being served 
notice by the Commission, does not stop the 
violation(s) and refrain from further committing it (Ar­
ticle 30).
The legislation applies to all practices likely to limit 
domestic competition irrespective of whether the rel­
evant agreements, decisions or restrictive practices 
originate in or outside Greece or whether the offending 
firms have a Greek parent company. Similar con­
siderations also apply to the abuse of dominant posi­
tion (Article 32).
the foreign experience
Evaluation of antitrust legislation involves analysis 
of the way in which such policies have thus far work­
ed, particularly in the United States, Britain and the
26. The country’s highest Administrative Court.
European Economic Community. The American ex­
perience is of special interest not only because of the 
long history of antitrust legislation in that country but 
because of the approach adopted, which is almost uni­
que. For these reasons, therefore, analysis of the 
American experience is of use to this paper, 
notwithstanding the differences between the American 
and Greek economies.
The first American antitrust legislation, the Sherman 
Act of 1890, had its origins in radical opposition to 
the excesses of the free enterprise system. It was a 
reaction to the growth of trusts and of restrictive prac­
tices of businesses. The Act contained two types of 
prohibition: one proscribed various restrictive trade 
practices (contracts, combinations, conspiracies) while 
‘the other made it illegal for a person to «monopolise» 
or «attempt to monopolise». Further legislation was 
enacted in 1914, with the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, in 1915, with the Clayton Act, in 1936, with the 
Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act, in 
1938, with the Wheeler-Lee Amendment to the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and, finally, in 1950, 
with the Anti-merger Amendment of the Clayton Act 
(Section 7).
One would expect that such a huge armoury of an­
titrust legislation should have precluded monopoly and 
monopolistic practice. That has not been the case. It 
was mainly in the area of anti-competitive conduct 
that the attention of the authorities was directed. The 
early vigorous application of the Sherman Act resulted 
in the formulation of the fixed rules discussed above, 
with two stringent standards which made illegal 
restrictive practices of trade and mergers between 
previously competing firms. Price fixing, in particular, 
was declared illegal, per se, a declaration reaffirmed on 
a number of occasions and under which, in 1961, 
seven executives were given prison sentences.
American antitrust legislation is almost unique in 
that it places such importance on competition that it 
(i.e., competition) becomes not the means towards cer­
tain ends but desirable for its own sake. Yet the Sher­
man Act has been powerless to deal with concentra­
tion of economic power, no significant case seeking to 
reduce of limit existing levels of concentration having 
been filed for at least 20 years prior to 1972.27 On the 
monopoly front, Blair summarises the history of the 
Sherman Act as follows: «Broadly speaking, enforce­
ment of the Sherman Act’s proscription of monopoly 
began with a little more than a decade of quiet neglect, 
followed by vigorous application up to 1911, only to 
be followed by nearly a half century of quiet judicial 
interment, then by a little-noted rebirth in the late 
1940’s and early 1950’s, and finally a second inter­
ment—this time at the hands of the enforcing agen­
cy.»28 This may, to an extent, be due to the original
27. S.E. Boyle, Industrial Organizalion-An Empirical Approach, 
Holt. Rinehart and Winston, 1972, p. 159.
28. J.M. Blair, Economic Concentration-Structure, Behavior and 
Public Policy, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, p. 558.
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per se rule having been changed in 1911 and the «rule 
of reason» doctrine having been introduced into 
judicial thinking. This, according to a number of 
critics, led to the emasculation of the antitrust policy.
Before 1945 the attitude both of the Antitrust agen­
cies and of the courts was that the mere size of a firm 
did not constitute an offence and that a firm had to 
exert monopoly power, through restrictive conduct, 
before it could be prosecuted. However, in 1945, in 
the Alcoa case, there was a change in judicial think 
ing, which condemned monopoly per se and put an 
end to the «good-trust v. bad-trust» criterion, which 
had dominated judicial decisions for the previous quar­
ter of a century.
On the merger front there had virtually been a free 
run up to 1950, with all types of merger activity con­
tinuing almost unchecked. This way due to the fact 
that (a) Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibited only 
the acquisition of a competing firm’s stock not its 
assets, and (b) a decision of the Supreme Court in 
1926 made prosecution under the Clayton Act almost 
impossible. However, following the amendment of this 
Act in 1950, the American Antitrust agencies (The 
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice) have pursued a different 
policy, have filed many merger complaints and have 
managed almost to eliminate horizontal mergers (Dur­
ing 1926-30 horizontal mergers accounted for 64.3% 
of the total merger activity; between 1951 and 1968, 
during which time such activity accelerated from 235 
manufacturing and mining acquisitions to 2407, 
horizontal mergers declined from 35% to 8% of the 
total). «In summary, it appears that it is only in the 
area of horizontal merger activity, and even there only 
since 1950, that the government has made any 
progress in halting or slowing the pace of increasing 
concentration».29 The pace, however, of the con­
glomerate mergers continued unabated, reaching 82% 
of the total in the period 1966-68 and persuading even 
businessmen of the need for stronger legislation.30 The 
operation, however, of the amended Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, with its restrictive effect on merger ac­
tivity, drew the wrath of the defenders of mergers. 
They argued that mergers, far from impeding competi­
tion, may be actually enhancing it (provided monopoly 
and oligopoly are attained through efficiency and are 
characterised by freedom of entry), and asked for the 
repeal of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.31·32
The failure of American antitrust legislation to 
preserve and to strengthen competition may be due to 
the fact that in spite of the professed devotion to such 
ideals, few people in Congress, the courts and in 
business seem prepared to see antitrust policy becom­
29. S.E. Boyle, op. cit., p. 161.
30. J.M. Blair, op. cit., pp. 597-8.
31. W.H. Peterson, «The Case against Antimerger Policy», 
Business Horizons, Voi. 4, No 4, 1961, pp. 111-20.
32. This is based on the familiar argument of attaching more
importance to the size distribution of firms than the fewness of
sellers, when discussing concentration in a particular industry. See
G. Petrochilos (1982, op. cit.).
ing an effective means of checking economic power. 
Businessmen seek to avoid competition and instead try 
to build up monopolistic defences against the uncer­
tainties and insecurities associated with competitive 
markets. The ability, for example, to make price deci­
sions independently of market forces of demand and 
supply is one of the characteristics of oligopoly attrac­
tive to businessmen. In this, they may be prepared to 
evade or to violate the law, particularly where the 
«rewards» of such actions are large. In these attempts 
they have, inadvertently (?), been helped by a confu­
sion between Congress and the courts as regards the 
objectives of antitrust. Other factors contributing to 
this situation have been the shortage of funds and of 
personnel in the antitrust agencies. This shortage has 
naturally hindered the agencies’ ability to deal effec­
tively with laborious and time consuming cases. Even 
where companies have been found guilty of breaches 
of antitrust the penalty is often small and consequently 
cannot have a strong deterrent effect upon other com­
panies contemplating similar actions. As a result the 
overall effect of American antitrust policy in shaping 
the industrial organisation of the American economy 
has, at best, been minimal.
The British experience of monopoly and restrictive 
practice has varied over time. Before the enactment of 
special antitrust legislation these aspects were treated 
under the common law. In certain cases contracts 
tending to create monopoly by eliminating competi­
tion, restricting output and regulating prices and 
wages, have been declared to be an illegal restraint of 
trade and thus void. But the courts have been reluc­
tant to declare contracts void on account of reasons of 
public policy and few agreements were therefore upset 
on this ground.33
The British antimonopoly legislation was the 
product of a social, legal and political environment dif­
ferent to the American.34 It followed in the wake of 
the full-employment policy of the government, en­
visaged in the White Paper of 1944, being almost a 
by-product of that policy.35 The first antitrust legisla­
tion in Britain was enacted in 1948 with the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act. The Act es­
tablished the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission which was empowered to examine: (a) if 
a monopoly did exist and (b) if the monopoly worked 
against the «public interest». Monopoly was held to ex­
ist if a firm had one third or more of a particular 
market, though it was not the existence but the abuse 
of monopoly power that was contrary to public in­
terest. The Commission would act on cases referred to 
it by the Minister of the (then) Board of Trade.36 After
33. Stevens and Borrie, Mercantile Law, Sixteenth Edition, But­
terworths, 1973, p. 517.
34. E.V. Rostow, «The Development of Law on Monopoly and 
Competition», Modern Law Review, Voi. 23, No 5, Sept. 1960. 
Reprinted in A. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 161-82.
35. G.C. Allen, op. cit., pp. 61-69.
36. Nowadays the Department of Prices and Consumer Protec­
tion.
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investigation, the Commission would report its findings 
to the Minister, who would then decide on appropriate 
action.
The Act did not define «public interest» but it gave 
the Commission certain guidelines according to which 
the public interest would best be served. Within these 
guidelines came any firm with monopoly power which 
ensured: the most efficient production and distribution 
for home and overseas markets; the reflection of such 
efficiency in quality, volume and prices; the en­
couragement of new enterprise; the optimum allocation 
of the country’s resources; significant technological ad­
vance; the expansion of existing markets and the 
development of new ones. This guidance, however, 
proved of little use to the members of the Commission, 
who were left to use their common sense in dealing 
with these problems.37
The policy introduced a pragmatic approach to 
tackling the problems of monopoly and restrictive 
practice but it suffered from the lack of clear objec­
tives and criteria, pragmatism being insufficient to en­
sure the policy’s effectiveness. To meet criticisms of 
the way in which the legislation worked, the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act 
was passed in 1953. This Act increased the size of the 
Commission and, in order to expedite matters, allowed 
it to subdivide and to process several enquiries 
simultaneously.
Following a general report by the Commission on 
the incidence and possible harmful effects of 
widespread restrictive practices in the UK industry, 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act was passed in 
1956. The Act separated the control of restrictive 
practices from that of monopoly and established both 
a Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements and a 
Restrictive Practices Court to deal with the former. It 
also set up a new Monopolies Commission (abolishing 
at the same time the old one) to deal with the latter. 
The Act, however, reduced the size of the Commission 
and prevented it from subdividing for the purposes of 
pursuing simultaneous investigations. It also prohibited 
the collective enforcement of resale price maintainance, 
whereas the 1964 Resale Prices Maintainance Act 
prohibited the enforcement of minimum resale prices 
by individual manufacturers, except under certain con­
ditions.
Dissatisfaction with the monopolies legislation con­
tinued, however. Existing monopolies could be dealt 
with by the legislation but there was no preventive 
means of dealing with takeovers and mergers which 
threatened to create new monopolies or to strengthen 
existing ones. Moreover, the legislation applied only to 
suppliers and processors of goods, thus excluding the 
service industries (banking, insurance, etc.). The small 
size of the Commission was also an obstacle in that it 
slowed down the pace of investigations. As a result, 
the Monopolies and Mergers Act was passed in 1965. 
It envisaged that proposed and actual mergers (with
37. G.C. Allen, op. cit., p. 66.
certain qualifications) could be referred to the 
Monopolies Commission for investigation of possible 
harmful effects on public interest. This particularly ap­
plied where mergers involved assets in excess of £5m. 
The Act increased the size of the Commission and em­
powered them to subdivide. It also brought the service 
industries within the ambit of the law. In 1968 the 
Restrictive Practices Act amended the 1956 Restric­
tive Trade Practices Act in three minor ways.
Nevertheless, the vagueness both of the legislative 
objectives and criteria was such that uncertainty per­
sisted. The reference of mergers to the Commission 
was characterised by an element of arbitrariness and 
inconsistency38 which was due, in some measure, to 
the pragmatic way in which merger policy was 
operated. Equally responsible for this inconsistency, 
however, was the overall economic policy of the 
Government which in 1966, through the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation, sought «to promote 
rationalisation schemes which would yield substantial 
benefits to the national economy». This involved the 
Government in the promotion of some fifty mergers; it 
even involved the acceptance of one merger which the 
Commission had previously declared to be against the 
public interest.39
To correct the above deficiencies, the Fair Trading 
Act was promulgated in 1973. The Act introduced 
new administrative machinery for the implementation 
of the legislation as well as two important points of 
substance. It repealed the 1948 and 1965 Acts and 
amended others. It set up the Office of Fair Trading 
and the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee 
and appointed a Director General of the Office of Fair 
Trading. The Director General, among other functions, 
took over the duties of the Registrar of the Restrictive 
Trading Agreements; he was also empowered to initi­
ate references to a reconstituted Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission. The Secretary of State, 
however, can overule the Director General while the 
minister also retains his right of referene. Fie alone can 
refer nationalised industries (which are now within the 
ambit of the law), this being considered a near-political 
decision.
Apart from these essentially administrative changes 
the Act is significant in other ways. For example, the 
extent of market share necessary to constitute a 
monopoly has been reduced from one third to one 
quarter. The guidance as to what constitutes public in­
terest has also been altered and for the first time it 
now emphasises the maintainance and promotion of 
effective competition. This is the clearest indication yet 
that competition is recognised as desirable and in the 
public interest. However, this did not change the basic 
favourable attitude of government towards mergers. 
For example, of a total of 353 acquisitions in 1976
38. See c.K. Rowley, «Monopoly in Britain: Private Vice but 
Public Virtue?», Moorgate and Wall Street, Autumn 1968, pp. 37- 
68 and C.K. Rowley «Mergers and Public Policy in Great Britain», 
The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. II, April 1968, pp. 75- 
DO.
39. The acquisition of Associated Fisheries by the Ross Group.
35
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 03:20:22 |
'Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών, a τετράμηνο 1981
there were only four references. Although the merger 
boom of 1972-73 seems to have subsided this develop­
ment is by no means the result of a more vigorous an­
timerger campaign on behalf of the authorities. On the 
contrary, on a number of occasions government has 
allowed takeover bids despite monopoly considera­
tions, justifying its allowance on the grounds of higher 
levels of efficiency, through economies of scale or the 
maintainance of jobs, as for example, was claimed in 
the non-referral case of Tate & Lyle’s takeover bid for 
Mànbre & Garton. Even after thirty years of experien­
ce government policy on antitrust appears to be influ­
enced by pragmatism and by political expediency. 
Currently the whole competition policy in Britain is 
again under review, with Whitehall particularly 
questioning the efficiency of mergers and examining 
restrictive practices with a view to strengthening the 
law in this area. The possible creation of new ad­
ministrative machinery to eliminate overlaps and to 
combine the functions of the Office of Fair Trading, 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the Restric­
tive Practices Court, and the Price Commission is also 
being considered.40 Whether the outcome of this 
review will herald a new philosophy on competition 
policy in Britain remains to be seen.
The European Economic Community’s antitrust pol­
icy is based essentially upon Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome. Articles 87 to 94 of the Treaty reg­
ulate aspects of antitrust machinery and cover the 
problems of dumping and of aid granted by member 
states where such aid is compatible with the Com­
munity’s objectives. Articles 65 and 66 of the Euro­
pean Coal & Steel Community (ECSC), which are 
similar to Articles 85 & 86 of the Rome Treaty, com­
plete the legislation as far as competition in the coal 
and steel industries is concerned. For all practical pur­
poses, however, the Community’s antitrust policy is 
enshrined in Articles 85 & 86. As was pointed out 
during the analysis of the Greek legislation, Art. 85 
prohibits restrictive practices, declaring them incom­
patible with Common Market objectives. (Certain 
agreements and decisions which contribute to efficien­
cy, distribution etc. and which do not impose undue 
restrictions or eliminate competition are, however, ex­
empted.) Art. 86, on the other hand, deals with abuse 
of a firm’s dominant position within the Common 
Market and prohibits abuse as incompatible with the 
Market’s objectives. However, Articles 85 & 86 should 
be considered as instruments by which to establish and 
attain the Community’s objectives rather than as 
legislation designed to curb market activity.41 In par 
ticular, Article 86 is more of a declaration of principle 
than a code of precise rules.
The proposed regulation on the control of mergers 
will perhaps be of greater importance to certain coun­
40. The Times, 31-10-1977, 28-11-1977.
41. S.M. James, «The Concept of Abuse in EEC Competition
Law. An American View», The Law Quarterly Review, Voi. 92,
April 1976, pp. 242-57.
tries within the Community, notably to Britain.42 The 
European Commission is seeking powers to control 
mergers in all industries, powers which are along the 
lines at present in operation in the coal and steel in­
dustries. Proposals put forward by the Commission in 
July 1973, and passed by the European Parliament in 
February 1974, would require firms to notify the ap­
propriate bodies of any merger or takeover which 
would result in a grouping with an annual turnover in 
excess of £400m. During a three month period after 
notification the merger or takeover will not be allowed 
to proceed without the approval of the Directorate 
General for Competition, the proposed new body. A 
further nine months is deemed necessary for full in­
vestigation of the merger, so that a year will elapse 
before the final decision is made. By the end of the 
year it is to be supposed that a number of the original 
conditions underlying the merger will have changed, 
and in many cases these changed circumstances will 
deter the interested parties from proceeding. It is also 
possible that interested parties will withdraw from 
mergers in frustration at the lengthy referral and ap­
proval procedure. However, all this is in the future. 
The time that has elapsed since the original proposals 
and the inability to reach final decisions on the subject 
suggest a lack of urgency on the part of the various 
bodies of the Community, and little political will 
among the member states. The way in which Com­
munity competition policy has operated in the past 
does, however, provide certain pointers as to its future 
direction.
The Community’s antitrust policy in its first decade43 
was largely based upon the application of articles 85 
of the Treaty of Rome and 65 of the ECSC Treaty. 
Attention was mainly focused on the ending of restric­
tive practice contrary to competition and also on the 
defining of areas and the fixing of limits of coopera­
tion among enterprises.44 The Council and the Com­
mission also saw the competition policy as an instru­
ment with which to fight against inflation in the Com­
munity. «The Commission’s measures against 
restraints of competition liable to maintain prices ar­
tificially high are part of the policy which must be pur­
sued both by the countries and at Community level to 
combat inflation.»45 In this connection Art. 85 has 
been used in particular «...to terminate market-sharing, 
the fixing of prices and quotas, and other devices em­
ployed by firms to maintain market fragmentation».46 
On a number of occasions Art. 85 was used to put an 
end to restrictive practices and to impose fines on 
culprits. In addition it was employed as a means of 
granting negative clearances to agreements and deci-
42. Third Report on Competition Policy, The European Com­
munities Commission, April 1974, points 22 to 38.
43. Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty were implemented in 
March 1962.
44. First Report on Competition Policy, The European Com­
munities Commission, April 1972, p. 24.
45. Second Report on Competition Policy, The European Com­
munities Commission, April 1973, p. 25.
46. Ibid., p. 15.
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sions, the object or effect of which was not detrimental 
to competition. The Community thus proceeded warily 
in its attempt to develop rules and criteria for future 
use and at the same time to lay down decisions which 
could protect and promote competition throughout the 
Common Market. Nevertheless, between 1964 and 
1970, the Commission handed down 34 decisions con­
cerning Art. 85, whereas in 1971 nineteen decisions 
were handed down under Articles 85 & 86 and twenty 
decisions concerning Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty.47 Restrictions on competition and practices 
which jeopardise the unity of the Communiy are 
proceeded against with particular vigour.
To an extent the pursuance of this policy against 
restrictive practice may have been dictated by the total 
lack of any merger or monopoly policy. Existing 
policy does not ban monopolies or mergers. If 
anything, cross-frontier mergers have been encouraged 
in an attempt to expedite economic integration. 
However, Art. 86 seeks to regulate the conduct of en­
terprises which exercise a dominant position within 
their respective industries. Excepting a preliminary rul­
ing by the Court of Justice in 1968, the Community 
really only began to apply Art. 86 in 1971. The 
criteria which need to be satisfied if an act is to be 
prohibited were largely established as a result of the 
first three cases brought in connection with violation 
of Art. 86. They are: (a) the undertaking charged with 
the act must occupy a dominant position in a par­
ticular product market and in a certain geographical 
area, (b) the act must be deemed to be an improper 
exploitation of that position, and, (c) there must be the 
possibility that trade between member-states will be af­
fected.
During 1971 the Commission handed down two 
decisions in cases involving Art. 86 — GEMA and the 
Continental Can Co. The Commission found that both 
had abused their dominant positions in their respective 
markets. In the GEMA case abuse resulted from un­
due restriction being placed on the economic liberty of 
authors, composers and music publishers, action which 
amounted to exploitation of GEMA’s monopoly posi­
tion, particularly in the German market. In the Con­
tinental Can case, however, the company was found to 
have abused its dominant position as a result of merg­
er activity having eliminated the remaining competitors' 
from three subsectors of the packaging industry. This 
abuse was found to extend to a large area of the Com­
munity. The significance of this latter case lies in the 
fact that, although the Court of Justice annulled the 
Commission’s decision to take action to dissolve the 
mergers (because the Commission failed to adequately 
define the market concerned), nevertheless, the court’s 
ruling was hailed as a landmark for future cases. This 
was so because the «court confirmed the soundness of 
the interpretation of Art. 86 which the Commission 
had developed in its decision».48 The interpretation was
47. First Report on Competition Policy, op. cit-
48. Second Report on Competition Policy, op. cit., p. 27.
that «the merger of an enterprise in a dominant posi­
tion with a competing enterprise is an abuse within the 
meaning of Article 86, if it restricts the freedom of 
choice of consumers in such a manner as to be incom­
patible with the competitive system laid down in the 
Treaty».49
Enforcement of Art. 86 continued with the ZOJA 
case. ZOJA, which had a de facto monopoly for an 
intermediary product, decided to discontinue supplying 
that product to a firm which had hitherto used ZO- 
JA’s supplies for the manufacture of a final product. 
This decision was held to constitute abuse of dominant 
position. The importance of this decision rests on the 
fact «that it establishes for the first time the principle 
that a de facto monopolist’s decision to discontinue 
supplies, so as to eliminate competition, constitutes an 
abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86».50 The company was ordered to resume 
supplies and fined 200,000 units of account.
Similarly, Art. 86 was enforced against the United 
Brands Co. (UBC) and against Hoffman-La Roche, 
both of which were held to have abused their domi­
nant positions. In the first case abuse consisted of dis­
crimination in pricing without objective reasons, 
prohibition of distributors’ reselling green bananas 
(thus fragmenting the market), the refusal to supply a 
main Dutch customer and other unfair practices. UBC 
was ordered to end its infringements and was fined lm 
units of account. In the Hoffman-La Roche case, 
abuse was found to exist in the conclusion of exclusive 
or preferential contracts which tied the most important 
buyers of bulk vitamins to the company and thus 
prevented competition in supply. The company was 
fined and ordered to stop its abusive practice.
When it comes to evaluating the Community’s com­
petition policy it must be remembered that the legisla­
tion is still incomplete and that enforcement of the pol­
icy has been brief. Nevertheless, from its application 
so far certain conclusions can be drawn. In dealing 
with violations of Articles 85 & 86 the policy has been 
flexible, and both the Commission and the Court of 
Justice have accepted the «rule of reason» approach. 
In dealing with the ZOJA and Continental Can cases, 
however, it has been suggested that the Commission 
and the Court of Justice accepted instead the per se 
approach, thereby moving towards a more rigid 
policy.51 In both cases, it is argued, the Court tried to 
preserve competition for its own sake without clearly 
explaining how decrease in competition indirectly 
harms consumers. Whether these two specific cases 
were decided by application of the per se or the rule of 
reason is debatable. Certainly the Court consistently 
followed the previously-established criteria regarding 
abuse of dominant position, and it is clear that in both 
cases the criteria were satisfied and that action was 
justified. More importantly, the problem seems to be 
one of underlying economic theory rather than of
49. First Report on Competition Policy, op. cit., p. 79.
50. Second Report on Competition Policy, op. cit., p. 55.
51. S.M. James, op. cit.
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legality. As if to confirm that there had been to shift in 
judicial thinking, the UBC case made clear that the in­
vestigation of the company’s entire marketing policy 
was undertaken «not so as to attack its commercial 
dynamism and economic performance, since this is not 
the purpose of Art. 86, but because a dominant firm 
has an obligation not to indulge in business practices 
which are at variance with the goal of integrated 
markets and undistorted competition in the common 
market».52
It would, however, be erroneous to conclude that 
competition is supreme in the Community. This is far 
from the case. Competition may be enshrined in the 
Treaty of Rome and the courts may have declared un­
lawful certain restrictive practices and abuses of pow­
er, but in reality the picture is different. The procras­
tination, the four years spent in discussing the merger 
proposals, confirms the view that the Community 
sacrifices competition to regulation as a means of 
somehow limiting the impact of recession. As has been 
suggested, political will is an important factor in the 
application of any public policy. It appears that 
currently the political will of the member states is not 
in favour of competition, a fact reflected in the Com­
munity’s agencies. In most member states there is a 
tendency away from competition and towards more 
regulation.
The new trend towards greater regulation is most 
evident in the European steel industry, the crisis within 
which «has prompted the Commission to move 
towards a quota and price cartel, extending thus the 
principle of regulation so far reserved for agriculture 
into the area of industry».53 Since this looks like an in­
fringement of Art. 65 of the ECSC Treaty, it would be 
rather too much to expect the Community to move 
towards more vigorous application of its competition 
policy in other directions.
evaluation
The Greek antimonopoly legislation is based on 
Western European models and in particular on the 
Community’s competition policy. This makes an 
evaluation of the prospects of the Greek policy 
somewhat easier, since predictions can be made in the 
light of the Community’s antitrust experience. Greek 
policy, in line with that of most European countries, 
tends to be rather pragmatic on antitrust. With regard 
to restrictive practices, the Greek legislation, by out­
right prohibition of certain agreements, decisions or 
actions, seems superficially to be based upon a per se 
approach. However, the exemptions of Article 1 
necessarily introduce a criterion of «reasonableness» 
which is, to say the least, vague. The pragmatic view 
on monopoly power is such that abuse of monopoly
52. Fifth Report on Competition Policy, The European Com­
munities Commision, April 1970, p. 59.
53. A.H. Herman, «Competition Bows out to Regulation in the
EEC», The Financial Times, 1 1-5-1977. See also The Times, 20-
12-1977.
power, rather than its existence, is deemed to be 
against the public interest. In this respect the law 
avoids the difficult task of defining either public in­
terest or dominant position, leaving it presumably to 
the Commission for the Protection of Competition and 
the courts to determine these points in specific cases.54
Of particular significance is the lack of regulation of 
mergers and takeovers in the Greek legislation. Merg­
ers and takeovers are accordingly allowed to proceed 
without restriction, apparently because the Greek 
authorities consider an increase in the size of firms 
desirable. No doubt this consideration may be dictated 
by arguments that mergers, particularly horizontal 
ones, are necessary if one is to achieve economies of 
large scale and force a more efficient utilisation of 
assets, especially in economies where the pace of inter­
nal expansion is slow. It is, of course, recognised that 
Greek firms are mostly small and that increase in size 
should facilitate the more rapid adoption of modern 
technology, while also producing a more efficient 
utilisation of assets. However, to what extent do these 
benefits outweigh the disadvantages entailed by curtail­
ment of competition through mergers? The experience 
of other countries suggests that these benefits may not 
be easily realised and that the social cost of 
monopolies may be considerable. Even assuming that 
this «rule of reason» approach can be adopted, the 
question remains empirical and unanswerable by a 
priori reasoning. An increase in monopoly power 
provides large enterprises with the conditions for abuse 
of their dominant position and in this respect con­
stitutes a conflict between Articles 2 and 4 of the 
legislation. This conflict arises as a result of the inter­
dependence between abuse of power and the power to 
abuse, and is confirmed by the American experience, 
on which Blair has commented that «...as the actual 
evidence in these cases illustrates, a dominant position 
in the real world is seldom achieved or even retained 
without abuse of power».55
Lack of appropriate data on industrial organisation 
in Greece is likely to impede the application of Arti­
cles 1 and 2 and the work of the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition. As stated, the issues are of 
an empirical nature and the structure-conduct- 
performance approach requires appropriate informa­
tion if a proper evaluation of various market structures 
is to be made. Such information is, unfortunately, dif­
ficult to obtain in Greece. For example, there are no 
measurements of concentration available despite the 
fact that the Greek Statistical Service collects the nec-
54. This omission, however, is likely to prove a thorny problem 
in practice and seriously undermine the effectiveness of the an­
timonopoly legislation. The lack of clear criteria and specific 
guidance, particularly with regards to public interest, introduces 
necessarily a considerable element of uncertainty and confusion 
and there is a danger that ad hockery and possibly political ex­
pediency may dominate the Commission’s discussions. Pragmatism 
may not be enough for the success of the new policy, as the British ex­
perience has shown.
55. J. Blair, op cit., p. 568. The same argument was also used 
by the Court in the Alcoa case.
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essary data through the decennial industrial censuses 
and yearly surveys. Such knowledge, for example, 
through concentration ratios, is indispensable for an 
antitrust policy since it could provide a first indication 
of the extent of monopoly power in various industries. 
Admittedly, even this knowledge is only the beginning 
of the story. Further detail is required, for example of 
the size distribution of firms in various industries. So 
too is knowledge of potential competition and of 
barriers of entry, etc. Most of this information does 
not violate the confidentiality of the censuses and one 
can only speculate on the purposes served by its non­
availability.
The cursory evaluation of antitrust policies in the 
United States, Britain and the EEC has shown that 
political expediency has played an important role in 
emasculating such policies. This, basically, is due to 
the conflict of objectives of economic policy. Antitrust 
priorities are likely to fare badly in relation to others 
superficially more pressing, a fact which further ex­
plains the emasculation. The erecting of monopolies 
and of monopolistic barriers is seen not only as an 
arguably natural defence for the firms concerned but 
also as defence of vital national or supranational inter­
ests. Protectionism at the micro level is soon accepted 
by the authorities at the macro level, and monopolies 
are not only tolerated but are occasionally actively en­
couraged, even when policies for promoting competi­
tion may coexist. The explanation of this is to be 
found in a contradiction contained within the free en­
terprise system. This is the tendency for greater 
centralisation and for concentration of capital which 
leads to increasingly bigger business units. These big 
units constitute the decisive vehicles of further 
capitalist reproduction and development. The survival 
and security of firms are better achieved and preserved 
behind monopolistic barriers, which naturally restrict 
the competitive forces. The competitive forces, 
however, are the essential principles, the firm founda­
tions upon which the system of free enterprise is 
based. Destroy these and you destroy the system. One 
view is that «Big Business has failed to distinguish bet­
ween free enterprise and private enterprise and ap­
parently is unwilling to admit that the former is essen­
tial to the preservation of the latter».56 It would ap­
pear, therefore, that big business does not believe in 
free enterprise. Competitors simply loathe competition. 
And it is hot only the economic mechanism of accum- 
mulation of capital which leads to concentration of
56. G.W. Stocking, «The Effectiveness of the Antitrust Laws», in
E. Mansfield, Monopoly Power and Economic Performance, Re 
vised Edition, Norton, 1968, p. 161.
economic power. Very often this process is actively 
encouraged by the authorities themselves. Under these 
circumstances the role of antitrust legislation in trying 
to regulate market activity, can at best be ambivalent. 
Antitrust legal rules are double-edged because 
although they are meant to maintain competition they 
also, by their nature, preserve the right of firms to 
grow, by which process they naturally reduce competi­
tion. «In a sense all antitrust legality leads to monopo­
ly illegality.»57
It is not unreasonable to assume that the application 
of the Greek antitrust legislation might be dictated 
more by considerations of (justifiable?) political ex­
pediency than by anything else. If industrial giants like 
the US, UK and the EEC find it appropriate to use 
political expediency as a criterion in decision-making 
with respect to business policy, one can hardly blame 
Greece if she were to do the same. Indeed, the ad­
ministrative bodies set up to implement the legislation 
(the Commission and the Office for the Protection of 
Competition) belong to the Civil Service, a fact which 
ensures that political expediency can be used almost at 
will.
The application of the Greek antimonopoly legisla­
tion is likely to be further circumscribed by the opera­
tion of other policies, such as for example Law 
2687/1953 on Investment and the Protection of For­
eign Capital, which offers foreign investors important 
privileges, thereby increasing their monopoly power. 
Further, it is possible for contradictions to arise in the 
operation of the two policies and, therefore, clashes to 
occur between different governmental departments em­
powered with their implementation.
The above considerations lead one to the conclusion 
that the first objective of the Greek antitrust policy, 
the harmonisation of the Greek legislation with that of 
the European Economic Community’s, has already 
been achieved. The chances of achieving the second 
objective, the protection of free competition, are not 
good. The most that this legislation can achieve is to 
deal with certain restrictive practices, excesses in the 
area of price fixing, market sharing, etc. This kind of 
redress is unlikely to achieve, however, much by way 
of ensuring a healthier and freer competitive system in 
the Greek economy. The refusal to face up to the 
problem of monopoly, which after all is the heart of 
the matter, makes the present policy a rather ineffec­
tive weapon with which to protect competition. Greek 
businessmen need not lose any sleep over this legisla­
tion.
57. R. Koundouros, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 
Business, Unfinished Ph. D. dissertation. Brunei University.
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